We report the first identified outbreak of cryptosporidiosis with Cryptosporidium cuniculus following a water quality incident in Northamptonshire, UK. A standardised, enhanced Cryptosporidium exposure questionnaire was administered to all cases of cryptosporidiosis after the incident. Stool samples, water testing, microscopy slides and rabbit gut contents positive for Cryptosporidium were typed at the Cryptosporidium Reference Unit, Singleton Hospital, Swansea. Twenty-three people were microbiologically linked to the incident although other evidence suggests an excess of 422 cases of cryptosporidiosis above baseline. Most were adult females; unusually for cryptosporidiosis there were no affected children identified under the age of 5 years. Water consumption was possibly higher than in national drinking water consumption patterns. Diarrhoea duration was negatively correlated to distance from the water treatment works where the contamination occurred. Oocyst counts were highest in water storage facilities. This outbreak is the first caused by C. cuniculus infection to have been noted and it has conclusively demonstrated that this species can be a human pathogen. Although symptomatically similar to cryptosporidiosis from C. parvum or C. hominis, this outbreak has revealed some differences, in particular no children under 5 were identified and females were over-represented. These dissimilarities are unexplained although we postulate possible explanations.
INTRODUCTION
We report an outbreak of Cryptosporidium cuniculus following a water quality incident in Northamptonshire, UK.
Cryptosporidiosis is a faeco-orally transmitted diar- We focus on the epidemiological characteristics of cases arising from this outbreak and discuss the differences from previous incidents. Local public health authorities were notified and a water supply emergency declared at 06.00 hours on 25 June.
METHODS
Control measures were instituted, including 'boil water' messages to users in the locality (Drinking Water Inspectorate ). To assess the extent of contamination, further water sampling was undertaken (continuous filtration and grab sampling) at strategic points in the distribution network, including from end user sites. A search for biosecurity failures was instigated and remediation initiated.
Network flushing and storage reservoir decontamination was undertaken.
Local health professionals were alerted and requested to submit stool samples for laboratory analysis from suspected cases of cryptosporidiosis and to notify the local public health authorities of such cases.
Case definition
After the incident it was unclear if any cases of cryptosporidiosis would occur. Existing surveillance systems were used to identify possible cases using the following case definition: Cryptosporidium sp. isolates were typed at the national Cryptosporidium Reference Unit, Singleton Hospital, Swansea (Chalmers et al. b) .
The distance of each case's home from the water treatment works was estimated using Microsoft Corp., MapPoint© (direct and by road (the latter chosen as water pipes, in part, follow road routes)).
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were undertaken in Stata (StataCorp Inc., version 10). Case characteristics were summarised.
Interquartile ranges are reported for medians. The significance of the difference in means and proportions was calculated with two group mean and proportion tests respectively. Parametric (linear) and non-parametric (Spearman's) regression analyses to assess the association between the date of onset of illness and volume of water drunk/distance from the water treatment works were estimated; p-values of 0.05 were considered statistically significant. Up to the week ending 6 August, 32 microbiologically confirmed cases of cryptosporidiosis were notified.
RESULTS
Twenty-three had C. cuniculus gp60 gene subtype VaA18 and were therefore linked to the incident epidemiologically and microbiologically (Chalmers et al. b) . Over the same period in the previous year, there were only four (unrelated) cases of cryptosporidiosis notified to the HPA from the same geographic area as this incident. Few data were available from one (non-responder). Although oocysts detected at end-user sites were not submitted for typing, seven water samples taken from other points in the network had C. cuniculus gp60 gene subtype VaA18 contamination, further strengthening the conclusion that the drowned rabbit was the source of the outbreak (Northampton Borough ).
There were seven male and 16 female cases (30% male); this difference approached but was not statistically signifi- All presented with diarrhoea. The first developed symptoms on 24 June and the last on 14 July. The mean date of diarrhoea onset was 2 July (1 July males, 2 July females,
Monitoring data indicated that the first possible date of Table 1 .
Water consumption
The median self-reported total daily mains water consump- 
Distance from water treatment works
The median distance of cases from the water treatment works was 6.24 (IQR 3.9-7.9) km direct and 9.8 (IQR 5.2-12.1) km by road. Neither correlated to the incubation period; however, the duration of diarrhoea was negatively correlated to the direct distance from the water treatment works (Spearman's rho À0.4847, p ¼ 0.0260).
DISCUSSION Cryptosporidiosis in the UK
Most human cases of cryptosporidiosis in the UK are due to However, it is now clear that C. cuniculus is a human pathogen (Chalmers et al. b) . Subsequent investigations have identified further sporadic cases in the UK (Chalmers et al. ) .
Monitoring for Cryptosporidium oocyst contamination in potable water supplies
Although not statutorily required to, the water company involved in this incident routinely checked for Cryptosporidium oocysts in both the raw and treated parts of the treatment system with continuous filtration cartridges placed at strategic points in the water flow. These cartridges were periodically changed and examined for oocysts. Although filtration analysis can detect contamination, it cannot determine viability, species type or pathogenic potential. For these reasons and because local immunity contributes to whether there is a hazard posed by the organism, there is no specific UK regulation standard for acceptable counts of oocyst contamination of potable water supplies. However, drinking water must not contain parasites at a concentration that could affect human health.
Water companies adopt a risk management approach for controlling water supply pathogens informed by the World Health Organization Water Safety Plan for drinking water standards (World Health Organization ).
Demographic characteristics of this outbreak

Sex ratio
The predominance of females affected in this incident is was therefore closer to 7 rather than the calculated mean of 9.2 days. However, in the absence of more precise data, other incubation period approximations would be speculative.
Surveillance and attack rate
It is surprising that few confirmed cases were identified
given that approximately 258,000 people were potentially Other research has suggested a lower ratio of 8.2 community cases to those notified and recorded in national surveillance data (Tam et al. ) . Nonetheless, the potential for differences in case ascertainment between the increased surveillance implemented as a result of the incident and that for routinely collected surveillance data (used to produce the above ratios) may make such comparisons invalid. However, if correct, the disparity observed between notified and estimated excess cases may suggest that C. cuniculus has comparable levels of population level impact to C. parvum and C. hominis and should therefore be viewed as a significant cause of waterborne disease.
Volume of water
The 2008 
Distance from the water treatment works
The duration of diarrhoea was statistically significantly negatively correlated to the direct distance from the water treatment works. This may be a chance finding; however, it could be that oocyst counts were lower at points further from the treatment works and viability could have also declined over distance. However, there was evidence of some concentration of oocysts in storage reservoirs and at customer taps but these were variable with some very low counts taken at similar times as higher counts at other 
).
Control measures and hazards
Boil water notice
A boil water notice was instituted early on 25 June. A risk/benefit-based decision to remove the boil water notice was made on 4 July. Four cases occurred after this date, two the day after the notice was lifted who would have probably been incubating the infection already and the others occurring on 13 and 14 July respectively, who were thought to be secondary cases C. cuniculus has conclusively been demonstrated to be a human pathogen (Chalmers et al. b) . The constellation of symptoms is similar to, but with some differences to other Cryptosporidium spp., especially the age and sex profile, as shown in Table 2 
